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The expanding limits of prosecutorial discretion 
 
CHEN SIYUAN* 
 
Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] SGCA 2 
 
The context 
The applicant was convicted of drug trafficking under the Misuse of Drugs Act1 and 
sentenced to hang. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful, but he filed a 
Criminal Motion to reopen judgment. He alleged a violation of his right to equality 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore;2 the alleged violation occurred 
when another accused who was involved in the same criminal enterprise (both had trafficked 
the same bag containing the drugs) was charged with trafficking in an amount of drugs 
quantified just below the threshold for the mandatory death penalty, while the accused was 
charged with trafficking in an amount that would lead to the mandatory death penalty if 
convicted.3 The Criminal Motion was dismissed. 
Although the Criminal Motion also involved the procedural issue of functus officio and the 
principle of finality,4 this piece focuses on the substantive issue of an accused’s constitutional 
right to equality in light of the Attorney-General’s constitutional power of prosecutorial 
discretion. The former is captured by Art 12(1), which states: 
All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law. 
The latter is found in Art 35(8), which states: 
The Attorney-General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, 
conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence. 
Court’s review of the jurisprudence 
The Court of Appeal identified four key precedents that might have shaped the outcome of 
the substantive issue, but pointed out their limited utility. The first case was Ong Ah Chuan v 
                                                           
* LL.B. (First) NUS, LL.M., Harvard; Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University.  
1 Cap 185, 2001 Rev Ed. 
2 1985 Rev Ed, 1999 Reprint. 
3 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [2]. 
4 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [9]–[18]. 
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Public Prosecutor,5 which the Court of Appeal said was distinguishable because it involved 
“the application of Art 12(1) of the Constitution to [mandatory death penalty] legislation, and 
not to the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion”.6 The Court of Appeal further noted that 
the “test of what equality before the law requires is not necessarily the same in both 
situations.”7 
The second case was Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor, which stood for the principle that 
equality before the law only requires the Attorney-General to give unbiased consideration to 
all offenders in criminal cases, and that irrelevant considerations should not be factored in 
when exercising his prosecutorial discretion.8 However, this case was also distinguishable 
because “it was concerned with the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion in relation to a 
single offender whose acts were punishable under two different statutory regimes carrying 
different punishments.”9 
The third case, Sim Min Teck v Public Prosecutor,10 while relevant insofar as it was 
“concerned with the prosecutorial discretion to differentiate between the charges against two 
offenders who were, in law, liable for the same criminal acts”, had applied the principle in 
Teh Cheng Poh “uncritically without considering the material difference between the factual 
situations in the two cases.”11 
The fourth case, Thiruselvam s/o Nagaratnam v Public Prosecutor,12 was similarly cloaked 
with doubt because of its uncritical application of Teh Cheng Poh; more than that, the case 
had suggested that the Attorney-General can charge an accused with a capital offence and 
another accused with a non-capital offence even if the former had played a lesser role in the 
criminal enterprise and was therefore less morally blameworthy.13 
The decision and some observations on it 
Given the lack of assistance offered by the aforementioned precedents, the Court of Appeal 
had to refer to first principles. Citing Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis14 and 
Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General,15 the Court of Appeal held that: 
In view of the co-equal status [of the Attorney-General and the Judiciary], the 
separation of powers doctrine requires the courts not to interfere with the exercise of 
the prosecutorial discretion unless it has been exercised unlawfully.16 The 
prosecutorial power is part of the executive power, although, under existing 
constitutional practice, it is independently exercised by the Attorney-General as the 
Public Prosecutor. In view of his high office, the courts should proceed on the basis 
that when the Attorney-General initiates a prosecution against an offender 
(regardless of whether he was acting alone or in concert with other offenders), the 
Attorney-General does so in accordance with the law.17 
                                                           
5 [1979–1980] SLR(R) 710. 
6 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [40]. 
7 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [20]. 
8 [1979] 1 MLJ 50 at 56. 
9 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [40]. 
10 [1987] SLR(R) 65. 
11 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [40]. 
12 [2001] 1 SLR(R) 362. 
13 Thiruselvam s/o Nagaratnam at [32]. 
14 [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [144]. 
15 [2011] 2 SLR 1189 at [139]. 
16 The word “unconstitutionally” was used in the previous paragraph: Ramalingam Ravinthran at [43]. 
17 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [44]. 
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The Court of Appeal, however, reiterated that “all legal powers are subject to limits”, and that 
an “inherent limitation on the prosecutorial power is that it may not be exercised arbitrarily, 
and may only be used for the purpose for which it was granted and not for any extraneous 
purpose.”18 It then held that: 
In cases where several offenders are involved in the same or similar offences 
committed in the same criminal enterprise… the Attorney-General… may take into 
account a myriad of factors in determining whether or not to charge an offender 
(including his co-offenders in the same criminal enterprise, if any) and, if charges are 
to be brought, for what offence or offences. These factors include the question of 
whether there is sufficient evidence against the offender and his co-offenders (if any), 
their personal circumstances, the willingness of one offender to testify against his co-
offenders and other policy factors. Where relevant, these factors may justify offenders 
in the same criminal enterprise being prosecuted differently. 
… the Prosecution is obliged to consider, in addition to the legal guilt of the offender, 
his moral blameworthiness, the gravity of the harm caused to the public welfare by 
his criminal activity, and a myriad of other factors, including… the possibility of 
showing some degree of compassion in certain cases.19 
On the facts, the Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive aspect of the Criminal Motion on 
three grounds: (1) the applicant was unable to produce any evidence to prove a prima facie 
case of a violation of Art 12(1) – pointing to the mere differentiation of charges does not 
suffice as differentiation may be legitimately undertaken for many factors;20 (2) there was no 
evidence on record to rebut the presumption of constitutionality vis-à-vis the decision to 
prosecute the applicant for capital offences rather than for non-capital offences; and (3) the 
evidence did not show that the applicant was less culpable than the other accused in relation 
to their respective drug trafficking offences.21 
As a preliminary point, there are perhaps several other local decisions worth highlighting. In 
Govindarajulu Murali v Public Prosecutor, the Court of Appeal held that “it is not for a 
court of law to consider the moral complicity of each accused person and question the 
Prosecution’s absolute discretion in deciding what charge to prefer.”22 This position was 
subsequently adopted in Sarjit Singh Rapati v Public Prosecutor.23 Then there is also Public 
Prosecutor v UI, which held that prosecutorial discretion is “an area outside the court’s 
purview”,24  and Yunani bin Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor, which stated that:  
It can be said, with some force, that the Constitution, by expressly conferring 
absolute prosecutorial discretion on the Attorney-General, does not contemplate any 
judicial oversight over the exercise of such discretion.25 
The point being made here is that there has been a discernible evolution in the 
jurisprudence. The older decisions tended to characterise prosecutorial discretion as an 
absolute power that was not amenable to any oversight, judicial or otherwise. On the other 
                                                           
18 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [51]. 
19 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [52], [63]. See also Ramalingam Ravinthran at [53], where the Court of Appeal 
made the broad proposition that the Attorney-General’s “final decision will be constrained by what the public 
interest requires”, as he is using his prosecutorial power “to enforce the criminal law not for its own sake, but for 
the greater good of society.” 
20 In this regard see also Mohamed Emran bin Mohamed Ali v Public Prosecutor [2008] 4 SLR(R) 411 at [26]–
[27], where the court said that the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial discretion is an executive act that is subject to 
the classification test as set out in Malaysian Bar v Government of Malaysia [1987] 2 MLJ 165 at 170. 
21 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [70]–[73]. 
22 [1994] 2 SLR(R) 398 at [40] (emphasis added). 
23 [2005] 1 SLR(R) 638 at [46]–[47]. 
24 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 270 at [6] (emphasis added). 
25 [2008] 3 SLR(R) 383 at [63] (emphasis added). 
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hand, decisions such as Tan Guat Neo Phyllis and Ramalingam Ravinthran have advanced 
an incremental progression from that position, in that prosecutorial discretion can be 
reviewed, but the circumstances in which it can be reviewed are fairly limited, and in any 
event there is a presumption of constitutionality afforded to prosecutorial decisions made by 
the Attorney-General. But even in Ramalingam Ravinthran itself we see possibly another 
incremental progression, albeit presented as obiter dicter. Essentially, the Court of Appeal 
thought it was necessary to address the slightly separate question as to whether the 
Attorney-General has a general obligation to disclose his reasons for making a particular 
prosecutorial decision (this became obiter because the applicant eventually dropped the 
argument), to which it said:  
Nothing in the present case can be said to raise any profound concern as to whether 
the Applicant was wrongly convicted of the offence with which he was charged … the 
Applicant is not protesting that he was wrongfully convicted. Instead, his case is that 
he was wrongfully prosecuted … Given the nature and width of the prosecutorial 
discretion, coupled with the fact that the Applicant did not avail himself of the two 
opportunities which he had to raise the issue that the Prosecution violated Art 12(1) 
in charging him … there cannot be any compelling grounds for this court to now 
direct the Prosecution, at this stage … to explain its reasons … 
Furthermore, given the manifold factors that the Attorney-General is entitled to take 
into account in making a prosecutorial decision, it would be wholly unrealistic for this 
court to proceed on the basis that the Attorney-General would be unable to point to 
any relevant consideration to explain his prosecutorial decisions … Indeed, it is not 
difficult to discern a valid consideration in the present case … It is a common and 
well-known practice for the Prosecution to take into account an offender’s willingness 
to testify against his co-offender when deciding what charges to bring against the 
offender as compared to his co-offender …26 
Reading between the lines, the Court of Appeal might be hinting that even if there is no legal 
requirement for the Prosecution to explain prosecutorial decisions, there may be some 
(extra-legal) value in doing so, especially since the reasons behind the decisions are usually 
not very mysterious.27 Interestingly, not long before this Criminal Motion concluded, the 
Law Society of Singapore had organised the 2011 Criminal Law Conference, in which the 
keynote lecture (delivered by Lord Goldsmith QC) happened to be about prosecutorial 
discretion. The introductory preface to the lecture was expressed in the following terms: 
With an increasingly rights-conscious society … notions of accountability, 
transparency and consistency can be expected to take centre-stage in analyzing 
prosecutorial decisions. How can prosecutorial discretion be safeguarded whilst 
ensuring that decisions are principled and fair? An increasing number of countries 
have promulgated guidelines that provide the public an insight into the principles 
that guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but would this result in 
unexpected problems and unnecessary pressure on prosecutorial agencies? How can 
the proper balance be struck between transparency and fact-sensitive justice? What 
institutional safeguards should there be to ensure that prosecutorial discretion is 
exercised in a principled fashion?28 
Two broad analogies may also be drawn from recent Court of Appeal pronouncements. The 
first is that a judge has a duty, in particular relation to fact-finding, to give well-reasoned 
decisions.29 The second is that even if certain material will not be used at trial, the 
                                                           
26 Ramalingam Ravinthran at [77]–[78] (emphasis in original). 
27 See also KC Vijayan, “Good if A-G explains charge decisions, lawyers say”, The Straits Times, 13 January 2011. 
28 http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/Conference/CLC2011/Topic3.htm. 
29 Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2011] SGCA 65. 
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Prosecution has a duty to disclose it if such material is relevant.30 Both duties may, of course, 
be quite readily distinguishable from the duty to explain prosecutorial decisions. For 
example, whereas the judicial duty to give reasons is founded in common law, there is as yet 
no legal prescription anywhere that mandates a duty to explain a prosecutorial decision. To 
cite another example, whereas the judicial duty to give reasons and the prosecutorial duty to 
disclose relevant evidence are essential to the establishment of truth (and therefore the 
safety of a conviction), the duty to explain a prosecutorial decision is not essential to such a 
purpose. However, the broad idea that undergirds all three duties is that all public 
institutions that determine fundamentally important questions (such as the life and liberty of 
a person) should, as far as possible, have transparent decision-making processes. This may 
be particularly important given the strong constitutional mandates bestowed upon the 
various arms of the government and the generally conservative judicial interpretations of our 
Constitution (that is, what is not written in it will not be lightly imported to explain what is 
written in it). Ultimately, the law can only say so much at any one point in time. Where the 
words of the law offer no further assistance, something else may have to enter the frame. 
                                                           
30 Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205. 
